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INTRODUCTION 
It is nearly nine years since Lehman Brothers collapsed, sparking one of the most 
significant financial crises and deepest recessions of our time. At the centre of this crisis was an 
obscure, then virtually unknown credit derivative called a collateralised debt obligation or 
µ&'2¶ A number of disciplines have advanced our understanding of the 2008 financial crisis, 
whether in finance (Acharya, Philippon, Richardson & Roubini, 2009), sociology (MacKenzie, 
2011), economics (Obstfeld & Rogoff, 2009; Crotty, 2009); or politics (Engelen et al., 2011). 
Yet despite the scale of the CDO market and the consequences of its collapse, there has been 
only muted interest from within organisation studies (OS) (see Munir, 2011).  
Our paper attempts to bring an OS analysis to the study of CDOs by tracing the changing 
supply side organisation of its structuration process over time. Empirically we draw upon our 
self-built database of CDO network relations drawing on a variety of industry documentation. 
Conceptually ZHWUHDW&'2VDVDµQHWZRUNHGSURGXFW¶WRDYRLGWZRWUDSVWKHWUDSRIUHDGLQJD
market through its lead organisation and the trap of viewing organisation ± and the structuration 
process in particular ± as one with a linear, sequential temporality. Methodologically we use 
social network analysis methods to explore the PDUNHW¶V RUJDQLVHG DQG HPHUJHQW G\QDPLFV
(D¶$QGUHW 0DUDEHOOL 1HZHOO 6FDUEURXJK 	 6ZDQ, 2016; Corbo, Corrado, & Ferriani, 2016; 
Dagnino, Levanti, & Mocciaro Li Destri, 2016), where network structure, field position, agency 
and power interact in a process of µbricolage¶ (Engelen et al., 2011 & 2012; MacKenzie & 
Pardo-Guerra, 2014). Our findings shed new light on agency, embeddedness, and governance in 
CDO structuration, and offers a new organizational perspective on the causes of the CDO crisis.  
 
BUBBLES AND THE DEMAND SIDE 
Finance is predisposed to booms and busts - DQGWKHPHWDSKRURIWKHµEXEEOH¶LVFHQWUDO
to most accounts of such crises. The history of the bubble metaphor is well known, with its 
RULJLQVLQSRHPVOLNH-RQDWKDQ6ZLIW¶Vµ6RXWK6HD3URMHFW¶DQGLQSULQWYLD'DQLHO'HIRH¶V
DOWHUHJR µ$QWL-EXEEOH¶ 'RZQLH)XUEDQN2ZHQV+D\WRQ	0F9HDJK Academically, 
the discussion of bubbles has been dominated by the discipline of economics, where it is 
discussed largely as a demand-side problem. Neo-classicals argue that bubbles can be understood 
DV µUDWLRQDO¶demand side responses in efficient markets if investors believe they can sell their 
asset at a higher price at some later point (Tirole, 1982; Blanchard & Watson, 1982); or when 
investors exploit information asymmetries (Allen, Morris & Postlewaite. 1993; Brunnermeier, 
2001). Behaviouralist economists, in contrast, emphasise investor irrationality as a driver of 
market excess (Shiller, 2012; Keynes, 1934; Tuckett & Taffler, 2008). Special focus is given to 
µVpeculative manias¶ZKHUH news of price increases spurs investor enthusiasm, reinforcing stories 
that justify the price increases, drawing in a larger and larger pool of investors (Kindleberger & 
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Aliber, 2005; Shiller, 2015). Explanations for the CDO bubble and collapse follow this pattern. 
Some focus on macro-imbalances, over-saving and the problems of too much (Chinese) money 
chasing too few dollar denominated assets (Ferguson & Schularick, 2011; Obstfeld & Rogoff, 
2009); others on more traditional concerns about moral hazard, speculation and subsidised risk-
taking in the financial services sector (Dowd, 2009; Acharya et al., 2009). The supply side 
analyses that do exist focus narrowly on either the Gaussian copula models used to structure 
these securities (Duffie, Eckner, Horel & Saita, 2009; Donnelly & Embrechts, 2010; Salmon, 
2011) or the usual problems around lax standards and/or fraudulent selling (Ben-David, 2009; 
Keys, Mukherjee, Seru & Vig, 2010). The exception is MacKenzie (2011) who explores the 
relations between MBS sellers, CDO structurers, and credit rating agencies. Our aim is to extend 
this analysis of the inter-organizational relations that form part of the CDO structuration process 
to glean an organizational perspective on the process of structuration in a bubble market and the 
potential causes of its collapse. 
 
µ&'2¶6 AS A NETWORKED PRODUCT 
A CDO is an asset backed security backed by the cash flows of other asset backed 
securities (see Duffie and Garleanu 2001; Langley 2008; Poon 2009). From a network-
organisational perspective, to create a CDO a number of connected function positions must exist, 
each positioned in specific cultural, institutional and regulatory contexts (see Fligstein, 2001 for 
discussion) which include: i) a financing relation between the initial purchaser in New York and 
the co-LVVXHUD6SHFLDO3XUSRVH9HKLFOHRUµ639¶LQ'HODZDUHWRDYRLGWKHFUHDWLRQRIa taxable 
event when asset risks are transferred (Tavakoli, 2008); ii) a transfer of asset risks between the 
co-issuer in Delaware and the issuer (another SPV) in the Cayman Islands to further reduce 
regulatory costs; and, iii) a marketing relation between the issuer in the Caymans and the listing 
agent on the Irish Stock Exchange to reduced tax payable on interest (Arthur Cox, 2013, p. 3). 
These three relations may look like they occur in a linear sequence, but in reality they are 
constructed contemporaneously for the purpose of minimising regulatory costs and maximising 
the gains from jurisdictional arbitrage. In addition, independent collateral managers were 
required to act on behalf of the buyer to select the underlying portfolio of securities and thus 
avoid mis-selling risk, and trustees were needed as custodians to report on and protect asset 
value. There were also legal advisors, payment agents, listing agents and administrators whose 
inputs were required by various parties. 
The CDO itself might therefore be thought of as a networked product which we define 
as a product: a) that is not embedded in a linear transformation process with value adding 
activities at each node; rather it is an assemblage of knowledge, socio-technical expertise and 
calculative technology brought to bear upon it contemporaneously; and b) where the conditions 
of profitability generate a requirement for certain function positions in certain jurisdictions 
within the network, creating co-dependencies between all actors involved in the process; where 
DFWRUV¶SRZHUWROHJLWLPDWHO\HQIRUFHRUFRHUFHDFWLRQVQRUPVDQGEHKDYLRXUVLVOLPLWHGE\WKHVH
mutual obligations and dependencies. 
The product therefore embraces a network logic ± it is the meeting point for a range of 
expertises and social relations, embedded in specific jurisdictional domains designed to arbitrage 
national legal and taxation arrangements. Product changes may alter the network if new 
requirements for certain skills empower other actors outside the network; or alternatively new 
entrants might offer new, more profitable means of structuring CDOs, thus changing the 
character of the product. Product and network thus sit in a dialectical relation, typical in a form 
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of financial innovation leG E\ SURFHVVHV RI µEULFRODJH¶ (QJHOHQ HW DO  ZKHUH µtangible 
cliques mutually observing each other, adjust behaviour¶:KLWH. 
The CDO network is not like a market where new entrants move into the supply chain 
on the basis of competitive or competence-based advantage. In networks, relationships may 
endure despite the presence of alternatives (Krackhardt, 2003) as a matter of convenience: 
working repeatedly with the same actors may reduce time and resources spent (Uzzi, 1997). 
Relations may also congeal and exclude others as systems of trust and reciprocity build (Kenis & 
Knoke, 2002). 7KH\ PD\ DOVR FRDOHVFH DURXQG VKDUHG µVKDGRZ QRUPV¶ /DPSHO  ZKLFK
may add to the cost of exiting relations. We trace this structuration network and assess the degree 
to which repeat relations persist using the following data and methods. 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
In terms of data, we built our database from Offering Circulars (OCs) ± documents 
issued by banks from which we obtained information about the relationships between actors 
involved in the process of structuring CDOs. These documents were sourced from a variety of 
SODFHVLQFOXGLQJWKH6HQDWH¶VFinancial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011) investigation into the 
subprime crisis, the Irish Stock Exchange databank and other online repositories. Overall our 
dataset contains 373 unique CDOs issued in USD between 2001 and 2008. The frequency of 
OCs from which we populated our database was dependent on data availability and broadly 
speaking mirrors the frequency of US originated CDOs. The database contains a total of 361 
firms involved in the US CDO structuration process. Although actors generally perform one 
supply-side service, there are notable exceptions ± for example some firms are involved in both 
trustee and administrative services. In those circumstances firms were allocated to the function 
they were most involved in.  
The OCs from which we took this information are lengthy documents published and 
distributed by the initial purchasers for a variety of users (investors, regulators, legal 
departments). OCs vary substantially from the glossy publications (pitch-books & term-sheets) 
aimed at investors: OCs are normally 200+ pages long and contain important detailed 
GHVFULSWLRQV RI WKH SURGXFW¶V VWUXFWXUHV PDQDJHPHQW DQG SURFHVVHV LQFOXGLQJ GLVWULEXWLRQ RI
income. Lengthy glossaries, disclaimers and tax considerations turn these OCs into highly 
µWHFKQLFDO OHJDO¶ DUWHIDFWV VHH 5iles, 2011 for a detailed discussion) from which valuable 
information about the organisation of the supply-side can be drawn.  
The salient points of detail are that CDOs are normally structured and arranged by 
investment or commercial banks (the initial purchasers), the underlying assets are selected and 
managed by an independent collateral manager on behalf of the issuer (an off balance sheet 
SPV, usually a wholly owned subsidiary of the initial purchaser) who then sells securities backed 
by the cashflows from these assets to investors. A trustee holds title to the assets of the CDO for 
the benefit of the investors (Tavakoli, 2008). There are also legal representatives to each party 
involved; plus Irish listing and paying agents who sell these securities on the Irish Stock 
Exchange for the benefit of institutional investors. 
The OCs cannot reveal the precise nature of the relationship between the agents, but it 
can be used to map interactions between the more prominent players and the centrality of those 
actors over time. Our network tracing focuses four lines of enquiry: i) an exploration of function 
position concentrations to understand the shape of the network and how they relate to product 
characteristics ii) a longitudinal analysis to explore the embeddedness of certain actors and their 
network relations over time iii) degree centrality to identify the presence of repeat relations and 
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actor interdependencies and iv) core-periphery analysis to consider whether specific network 
patterns might provide new insights as to the causes of problems in the sector. 
  
RESEARCH FINDINGS: AGENCY, EMBEDDEDNESS, GOVERNANCE AND CAUSES 
Our research findings from the social network analysis tell us four things. First, it tells 
us something about agency and the dialectical relation between the product and the network. A 
CDO is not a tangible product embedded within a supply chain with a linear transformation 
process and value adding activities at each node. A CDO is intangible - the product of an 
assemblage of knowledge, socio-technical expertise and calculative technologies brought to bear 
upon it contemporaneously. Changes at the level of the product requires negotiation, 
collaboration and mutual changes in practice across central function positions within the 
QHWZRUN$JHQF\LV WKHUHIRUHµGLVWULEXWHG¶EHFDXVHDFWRUVZLWKLQWKHQHWZRUNDUHFR-dependent, 
which limits the power of any one actor to fully exert bureaucratic control or coercion. However 
if CDOs are to be scalable and profitable the network must include certain function positions, 
often within specified jurisdictions. Risk minimising positions like collateral management are 
viewed as essential trust-building features for clients which allows the market to grow, whilst 
CDO profitability depends on minimising regulatory costs which fixes certain function positions 
in particular jurisdictions - such as the presence of issuers and co-issuers in Delaware and the 
Caymen Islands respectively. Thus the CDO - as a networked product - also influences the 
structure of the network. 
Second, it tells us something about social and economic embeddedness within the 
network, through our longitudinal study of initial purchasers and other actors. Those IPs who 
were present and core in the early stages of market formation were more likely to remain there 
than new entrants, suggesting some kind of positional or relational embeddedness at work. This 
is not to suggest that the growth of the market did not pull in new actors: there is a rising number 
of firms in total within the network between 2002-2007 and a growing number of actors in the 
core. However, despite that growth, banks like Merrill Lynch, Citigroup and Goldman Sachs 
retained their position in the top 5 CDO initial purchasers in all three years of peak activity 
(2005-7). Furthermore, the structure of network relations consolidates during this growth phase, 
suggesting either that as market opportunities expand, the value of the existing relations between 
nodes increases, or that the social relations which underpin these networks may act as a barrier to 
entry (Uzzi, 1997). This may imply that whilst there are no formal alliances between function 
positions, there are less visible but nevertheless strong, embedded social ties between key actors 
(Granovetter, 1973).  
Third, the surprising centrality of law firms in the network tells us something about 
structure, governance and power within the CDO structuration process. It is conventional to 
represent the CDO market as something put together exclusively by the banking industry for the 
banking industry. Our analysis shows a much more complex picture - one where there are strong, 
repeat relations - µSUHIHUUHGDWWDFKPHQWV¶- between particular elite law firms and particular elite 
ILQDQFLDOLQVWLWXWLRQV7KHVHIRUPDµFRUH¶FRUHZLWKLQRXUVRFLDOQHWZRUNDQDO\VLVVXJJHVWLQJWKH
presence of longer term attachments that build a sense of co-dependence and mutual interest. The 
process of innovation through bricolage (Engelen et al., 2012) within the CDO market might 
therefore emerge from an ongoing dialogue between law and finance in a context where 
regulatory arbitrage is central to the profitability of the product and where change occurs through 
the social actions of interdependent actors observing each other and adjusting behaviour, as 
White (1981a) observes. 
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Fourth, it tells us something different - potentially - about the causes of the 2008 crisis. 
We observe a strong core-periphery structure in our network, where the periphery contains many 
independent collateral managers involved in only one or two CDOs. This structural feature 
represents an attempt to allay client fears about impropriety and moral hazard by having an 
independent entity separate from the IP to select and manage the CDO assets. Notionally this 
independence allowed collateral managers to reduce the risk exposure and increase the likely 
return for the client. However, as we have shown, collateral managers in the network periphery 
could only select assets put together by a relatively small group of core firms in the network. The 
benefits to diversification or active management of those assets, therefore, were limited for the 
simple reason that they were structured by the same interconnected core. This organisational 
feature may have played some role in the crisis, if only to sedate the normal sensitivities to risk 
had clients bought securities directly from the IPs.  
These findings contribute to the ongoing discussion within organisation studies about 
WKHµFROOHFWLYHQDWXUHRIRUJDQLVDWLRQDODFWLRQDQGWKHUROHRf networks in maintaining stable 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
A key ambition of our research project was to trace the evolution of the CDO market 
leading up to the financial crisis using network analysis in a way that opens up debate for 
organisational scholars. Fundamentally, our focus here was to enrich existing studies by adding 
an element of agency, not at the macro level, but at the level of individual actors. 
The view of CDOs as networked products itself is an important conceptual innovation 
as it opens up a debate about the functional expertise that is required to produce this product and 
how this shapes the structure of the supply market,QVRPHZD\VWKHUHDUHVLPLODULWLHVWR:KLWH¶V
(1981 & 2002) work on the general mechanisms through which actors seek to shape networks 
and markets: ³PDUNHWV DUH WDQJLEOH FOLTXHV RI SURGXFHUV REVHUYLQJ HDFK RWKHU´  
where cliques generally consist of suppliers, producers and buyers (2002: 6). However, our case 
offers a different account whereby cliques are defined at the level of each CDO product. These 
cliques are initiated through a focal firm, an investment bank or CDO sponsor, but relationships 
are more network-like because to produce a CDO, functional expertise is required to ensure 
profitability and it is this requirement that structures the activity in the supply-side. Thus the 
product itself has agential qualities and constraints and shapes network structures based on its 
specific requirements, and this is relevant in explaining how supply-side activity is organised and 
organises itself. However this does not explain the different dynamics observed for functions. 
The growth of unique actors (from 31 in 2001 to 236 in 2007) in itself is intuitively 
relevant with respect to :KLWH¶V QRWLRQ WKDW FOLTXHV HVWDEOLVK PDUNHWV LQLWLDOO\ WKURXJK DQ
alignment of activity and quality of outputs to create a set of specific market norms of behaviours 
(Fligstein, 2003). However it only offers limited insights into the emerging structures because it 
ignores functional distinctiveness. As argued previously, some functions activity remains 
concentrated in few actors ± there are only 5 issuers/co-issuers involved in 2001 rising to 13 in 
2007 ± whereas other functions features a much larger range of unique firms: the number of law 
firms increases from 7 (2001) to 51 (2007) and collateral management firms increase from 5 to 
88 respectively. This suggest that the organisation of functional expertise follows different 
logics: the concentration of ties per function ranges from effective monopoly and duopoly 
positions of actors (co-issuers and issuers) to very broad and non-repetitive allocation 
mechanisms for (most) collateral managers. Other functions, such as law firms and investment 
banks, feature a high number of unique actors, but activity across functions remains concentrated 
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in few firms at the network core. There is something much more organising and agential about 
how the supply-side is organised through key actors, investment banks or CDO sponsors, who 
make decisions about the suppliers that will be involvHGEDVHGRQ WKHLU ³LGHDV DERXW ZKDW WKH
PDUNHW PLJKW EH DQG VRPH QRWLRQV DERXW ZKDW RWKHU SHRSOH DUH GRLQJ´ )OLJVWHLQ, 2003: 673) 
given the constraint of the market. Whilst a culture that is specific to the CDO market emerges 
HDUO\RQ WKH ILUPV¶ DJHQF\PD\HLWKHU UHSURGXFHRU FKDOOHQJH WKHVH DQG WKHLUDELOLW\ WRGRVR
may be greatest if these are centrally embedded. 
The traditional treatment of the relationships formed between actors involved in CDOs 
DUHDWILUVWJODQFHSXUHO\FRQWUDFWXDO³XQGHUVRFLDOL]HG´*UDQRYHWWHU, 1973), both at the level of 
the supplier-firm relationship as well as the investor-seller. At the level of the product, the 
duration of a tie in our network is effectively limited to the production process of each CDO. 
However, this changes when we take into account the repeat interactions between (central) actors 
in the aggregate network what are maintained over long periods of time through joint 
involvement in further CDO creation and may create a more sustained, social relationship. The 
relationships in our network are thus of two types: 1) arms-length relationships where there is no, 
or limited repeat interaction between actors; and 2) embedded relationships where repeat 
interactions occur between two actors or more (Uzzi, 1997; Granovetter, 1985). The former 
would naturally involve organisations that are peripheral to the market, whilst the latter occurs 
between actors that exhibit high centrality scores. Recurring interaction between these central 
actors that create a capacity for knowledge, resources and capabilities to homogenise (Rowley, 
Behrens & Krackhardt, 2000, Uzzi, 1997) and consequently it is these DFWRUV¶ LQcreasing 
embeddedness in the supply-side and capacity to re-/produce market norms and behaviours 
through repeat interactions (Gulati, 1995; Uzzi, 1997). From an OS perspective, this is important 
as it mirrors %HFNHUW¶V (2010) call for the inclusion of networks in the theoretical treatment of 
changes to market fields, where institutions, cognitive frames and (agency through) social 
networks interact thereby transforming the nature of the market over a period of time. To some 
extend it speaks to a struggle for market share between incumbents and challengers discussed by 
Fligstein (2001). 
Noting the strong divide between core and peripheral actors, some of the prominence 
may be explained through preferential attachment (Barabasi & Albert, 1999), where more 
prominent nodes receive more ties. However, given the structural limitations of the CDO as a 
networked product and its specific requirements, we would argue that a less mathematical and 
more sociological treatment of preference may be more suitable in explaining repeat interactions. 
We thus prefer to speak of preferred attachment between organisations where repeat interaction 
may indeed produce some competitive advantage. Gulati and Gargiulo (1999) and Powell, 
White, Koput and Owen-Smith (2005) suggest that these are linked to similar status of actors 
which may be particularly true for law firms and investment banks which hold symbolic capital 
and power (Bourdieu, 1987). However, given the highly specific and relatively low-status or 
mundane nature of activities some of these actors are involved with in our case (for example, 
payment and listing agents or administrators), some of these may reflect the constraining force of 
the product requirements, and given that little advantage may be gained from altering these 
relations with respect to a reduction of transaction costs through prolonged engagement. 
The results of our analysis of CDOs as networked products raise a number of important 
questions about the organisation of a bubble market like CDOs in a way that opens up debate for 
organisational scholars. By shining light on the mundane structures that emerge from our 
network analysis, we have built foundations on which to further discuss patterns and key 
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positions of network actors that are of interest. At its most fundamental level, our study reveals 
structures and suggests agency which should form the basis for further enquiry. Financial 
activity, organisations, markets and their products become increasingly complex, and such 
complexity requires organisations to pool expertise. Thus from the very outset, what it takes to 
create the product itself, because of its reliance on multiple parties, has implications for agency 
and structure of the market in future; and here, the complexity arising from the involvement of 
multiple actors means that both micro and macro-level explanations become increasingly 
problematic as organisation occurs through these interactions. 
By focusing on this particular bubble, we hope to have created a novel way of 
understanding how distortions in markets are created as arising from seemingly mundane, yet 
complex activities visible in the supply networks and interactions between multiple interested 
parties. As such, previous investigations that zoomed in on investment banks as primary 
proprietors of CDOs appear insufficient in light of the involvement of a host of other essential 
agents and the concentration of some of these functions in relatively few actors. Moreover, our 
analysis raises a more poignant question about the creation of new markets where financial 
innovation is fast-paced, yet of little social usefulness, in particular when those markets failure 
has substantial and long-term repercussions for economy and society. In an effort to understand 
ILQDQFLDO FULVHV DQG LQGLYLGXDO DFWRU¶V DFWLYLW\ IXWXUH UHVHDUFK VKRXOG QRW RQO\ IRFXV RQ WKH
obvious actors within a market ± the ones visible to the buyers and of interest to regulators and 
politicians. Instead, future analysis should target actors that remain out of sight from public 
debate.  
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